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LOCKETT SYMPOSIUM 
JUSTICE WHITE’S LOCKETT CONCURRENCE AND THE
EVOLVING STANDARDS FOR A CAPITAL DEFENDANT’S
MENS REA 
Jordan Berman* 
In Lockett v. Ohio, Justice Byron White authored a separate 
concurring opinion specifically to assert that capital punishment violates 
the Eighth Amendment when imposed absent “a finding that the defendant 
possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim.”1 This view was 
largely vindicated when Justice White authored the opinions in Enmund 
v. Florida2  and Cabana v. Bullock,3 in which the Court held that the death
sentence could not constitutionally be imposed on one who did not kill or 
attempt to kill or have any intention of participating in or facilitating a 
killing. Nonetheless, just one year after Bullock, White joined in the 
majority in Tison v. Arizona to hold that the Eighth Amendment does not 
prohibit the death penalty even where the defendant’s mental state is one 
of reckless indifference.4 That standard exists to this day and is a marked 
departure from Justice White’s stand in Lockett. It suggests a pattern of 
increasing and sometimes case-specific compromises that the Court made 
in order to reach the death penalty as it now exists. 
Part I of this paper analyzes Justice White’s death penalty 
jurisprudence leading up to Lockett, including his statement in Furman v. 
Georgia5 that the capital punishment statute at issue “has for all practical 
purposes run its course.”6 Part II reflects on the significance of Justice 
* Research and Writing Attorney, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Public Defender of the Southern
District of Ohio, and Adjunct Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. Thanks to Jake Cairns of 
the Federal Public Defender for his editorial assistance. 
1. 438 U.S. 586, 624 (1978) (White, J., concurring).
2. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
3. 474 U.S. 376, 377 (1986). 
4. 481 U.S. 137, 137-38 (1987). 
5. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). 
6. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
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White’s concurrence in Lockett, including paving the way for narrowing 
the death penalty in Enmund and Bullock. Finally, Part III 
analyzes Tison and the current state of the law regarding a defendant’s 
mental state. The paper concludes that the principles Justice White 
articulated in Lockett better represent the Court’s stated goals of 
deterrence and individualized consideration. 
I. JUSTICE WHITE’S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO 
LOCKETT V. OHIO 
Although Justice White concurred in Furman v. Georgia that the 
death penalty statutes at issue constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, he made clear that his 
was not a moral opposition to the existence of capital punishment overall.7 
Nevertheless, Justice White provided a crucial fifth vote, resulting in a 
moratorium on the death penalty in the United States. His concurrence did 
not focus on any excesses of the death penalty, but rather on the 
infrequency of its imposition. He noted that sentencing authority has been 
vested “primarily in juries,” and those juries seem to have created a policy 
in which the death penalty is hardly ever imposed, and imposed without 
reasonable distinction.8 For that reason, Justice White found that the 
policy of jury discretion “has so effectively achieved its aims that capital 
punishment within the confines of the statutes now before us has for all 
practical purposes run its course.”9 
By “run its course,” Justice White’s concern seemed to be that the 
states weren’t imposing the death penalty often enough for it to be 
effective: in other words, “that as the statutes before us are now 
administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of 
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal 
justice.”10 Accordingly, Justice White believed the death penalty was no 
7. Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring) (“I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se or that there is no system of capital punishment that would comport with the 
Eighth Amendment.”). 
8. In Furman, “White noted the good faith of Georgia in granting discretion to sentencing 
juries out of a ‘desire to mitigate the harshness’ of capital punishment laws.” Kate Stith, Byron R. 
White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 Yᴀʟᴇ L.J. 19, 29 (1993) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 
(White, J., concurring)). Professor Stith was a law clerk for Justice White in the October Term of 
1978. 
9. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
10. Id.
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longer an effective deterrent if used so infrequently as to be “the pointless 
and needless extinction of life” without furthering any social end.11 
Just four years later, however, he concurred with the majority in 
Gregg v. Georgia that Georgia’s updated death penalty statute was 
constitutional, effectively bringing the death penalty back to life.12 Justice 
White held that with the more detailed guidance to juries in Georgia law, 
“if the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task assigned to it 
under the Georgia statutes, death sentences imposed for discriminatory 
reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any given category of crime will be 
set aside.”13 
In fact, Justice White would have upheld all of the death penalty 
statutes before the Court that day in 1976, including those states with 
mandatory death sentences for certain crimes. He reasoned that a 
mandatory death sentence is a consistently-imposed deterrent and 
accordingly dissented from the Court’s plurality opinion in Woodson v. 
North Carolina holding a mandatory death sentence for first-degree 
murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.14 In Roberts v. 
Louisiana, Justice White similarly expressed support for Louisiana’s 
mandatory death penalty scheme for five categories of first-degree 
murder: “Even if the character of the accused must be considered under 
the Eighth Amendment, surely a State is not constitutionally forbidden to 
provide that the commission of certain crimes conclusively establishes 
that the criminal’s character is such that he deserves death.”15 Justice 
White’s approval of the mandatory death penalty underlines his belief that 
there is nothing inherently cruel and unusual about the death penalty 
itself.16 In particular, he noted the public support for the death penalty, 
11. Id. at 312. 
12. 428 U.S. 153, 154-55 (1976). 
13. Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987) 
(Justice White joined the majority to again find that Georgia’s death penalty was not “wantonly or 
freakishly” imposed, despite statistical study purporting to show disparity in imposition of death 
sentence in Georgia based on race of murder victim and defendant).  
14. 428 U.S. 280, 307 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that a mandatory death sentence
does not implicate the constitutional concerns raised in Furman about “seldom and arbitrary” 
imposition of the death penalty). See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260–61 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring) (“There is good reason to anticipate, then, that as to certain categories of murderers, the 
penalty will not be imposed freakishly or rarely but will be imposed with regularity; and consequently 
it cannot be said that the death penalty in Florida as to those categories has ceased ‘to be a credible 
deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment in the criminal justice system.’”) 
(quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring)). 
15. 428 U.S. 325, 358 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
16. Id. at 350 (White, J., dissenting) (“I also cannot agree with the petitioner’s other basic
argument that the death penalty, however imposed and for whatever crime, is cruel and unusual 
punishment. . . . It is plain enough that the Constitution drafted by the Framers expressly made room 
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pointing to the large number of states that re-enacted the death penalty in 
the years after Furman.17 
His approval of the death penalty stemmed in part from an abiding 
faith in and deference to the criminal justice system, which he repeatedly 
emphasized in his opinions.18 For this reason, he declined to interfere with 
capital punishment proceedings and asserted that that prosecutors and 
appellate courts,19 legislators,20 and juries themselves,21 for example, 
would uphold the system and correct any flaw.22 The number of 
exonerations in the years since he was on the bench may call this 
conclusion into question,23 or it may have furthered Justice White’s belief 
in the power of the courts and advocates to find and correct mistakes. 
Justice White recognized that the death penalty had limitations, 
however, including when capital punishment is “is grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime.”24 Writing for the plurality in 
Coker v. Georgia, for example, Justice White held, “We have the abiding 
for the death penalty.”). 
17. Id. at 352-54 (White, J., dissenting) (“The widespread re-enactment of the death penalty, it 
seems to me, answers any claims that life imprisonment is adequate punishment to satisfy the need 
for reprobation or retribution.”). 
18. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 226 (White, J., concurring) (“I decline to interfere with the
manner in which Georgia has chosen to enforce [capital punishment] . . . laws on what is simply an 
assertion of lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally fair 
manner.”). 
19. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (“Obviously law
enforcement officers can make mistakes and exceed their authority, as today’s decision shows that 
even judges can do, but I have somewhat more faith than the Court evidently has in the ability and 
desire of prosecutors and of the power of the appellate courts to discern and correct such violations 
of the law.”) 
20. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 355 (White, J., dissenting) (“It will not do to denigrate these legislative 
judgments as some form of vestigial savagery or as purely retributive in motivation; for they are 
solemn judgments, reasonably based, that imposition of the death penalty will save the lives of 
innocent persons. This concern for life and human values and the sincere efforts of the States to pursue 
them are matters of the greatest moment with which the judiciary should be most reluctant to 
interfere.”).  
21. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“[I]t should not be
assumed that juries will disobey or nullify their instructions.”). 
22. For this reason as well, Justice White believed that capital punishment for minors was
constitutional, for example when he joined the dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815, 875-
76 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that “what the laws of the Federal Government and 19 
States clearly provide for represents a ‘considered judgment,’” and that the Governor of Oklahoma 
“[w]ould certainly have used his pardon power if there was some mistake here.”) (citations omitted). 
23. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2757 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
number of exonerations in capital cases has risen to 115.”) (citations omitted); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 
U.S. 163, 207–08 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (DNA exonerations constitute “a new body of fact” 
when considering the constitutionality of capital punishment). 
24. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
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conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and 
irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does 
not take human life.”25 In that 1977 opinion, he also noted that a defendant 
may be eligible for the death penalty in Georgia “when in the commission 
of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of 
malice,” so long as there are aggravating factors.26 If he seemed concerned 
about the death penalty’s application to those who did not intend to cause 
death, he did not reflect it in that opinion, though that was not the subject 
of Coker. His concern about a capital defendant’s mens rea, even for 
murder cases, became clear in Lockett the following year. 
II. JUSTICE WHITE’S CONCURRENCE IN LOCKETT AND THE
SUBSEQUENT NARROWING OF THE DEATH PENALTY BASED ON MENS 
REA 
In Lockett, the Supreme Court struck down an Ohio death penalty 
statute that did not permit individualized consideration of certain 
mitigating factors in capital cases holding that such a restriction violated 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.27 The petitioner in that case 
stayed in the car while her associates robbed a pawn shop.28 Although 
there was no plan to kill, the pawnbroker grabbed the gun when one of the 
robbers announced the “stickup.”29 The pawnbroker was killed when the 
gun went off.30 A plurality of the Court reversed the petitioner’s death 
sentence because the Ohio statute “did not permit the sentencing judge to 
consider, as mitigating factors, [the petitioner’s] character, prior record, 
age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in 
the crime.”31 Other than listing the lack of specific intent as a mitigating 
factor, the Court did not delve into whether it was appropriate to execute 
someone without an intent to kill. 
Justice White devoted his concurrence to requiring a mens rea of 
intent for capital punishment: in particular, to the principle, “ignored by 
the plurality, that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose the penalty 
of death without a finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to cause 
25. Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)); see also Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, Syllabus ¶ 3 (1983) (Justice White joined the majority in finding “life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole is significantly disproportionate to” a minor crime, in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment). 
26. Id. at 600. 
27. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
28. Id. at 590. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 597. 
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the death of the victim.”32 Although Justice White did not agree that 
limiting consideration of mitigating circumstances was unconstitutional, 
he found that the Ohio statute in that case violated his proportionality 
requirement in two ways: 1) the “extremely rare” imposition of the death 
penalty “upon those who were not found to have intended the death of the 
victim” makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of 
punishment; and 2) the sentence is “grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the crime.”33 
Regarding the extreme rarity, Justice White found it “clear from 
recent history that the infliction of death under circumstances where there 
is no purpose to take life has been widely rejected as grossly out of 
proportion to the seriousness of the crime.”34 He noted that only eight 
executions since 1954 clearly involved individuals who did not commit 
the murder—far fewer than those executed for rape—though he seems to 
acknowledge that this is a separate measurement from those who intended 
to cause the death of the victim.35 Justice White also found any “deterrent” 
value in executing those without a purpose to kill is “extremely 
attenuated,” as it is doubtful that people will be deterred from “becoming 
involved in ventures in which death may unintentionally result.”36 This 
doubt was particularly strong in light of the “occasional and erratic basis” 
on which such executions occur.37 Accordingly, Justice White stated that 
“society has made a judgment . . . distinguishing at least for purpose of 
the imposition of the death penalty between the culpability of those who 
acted with and those who acted without a purpose to destroy human 
life.”38 
Justice White found particularly problematic that Ohio seemed to be 
imposing the death penalty in cases with a mens rea of at most 
“recklessness: conduct undertaken with knowledge that death is likely 
to follow.”39 Accordingly, he argued that such a punishment was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate, concluding, “Since I would hold that 
32. Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
33. Id. (citing his own opinion in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
34. Id. at 625. 
35. Id. at 624-25. 
36. Id. at 625. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 626. Justice White cited to United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., for the principle that
such distinctions have deep roots in the history of criminal law. 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“We start 
with the familiar proposition that ‘[the] existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception 
to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’” (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494, 500 (1951)). 
39. Id. at 627-28. 
2018] JUSTICE WHITE’S LOCKETT CONCURRENCE 39 
death may not be inflicted for killings consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct with 
the conscious purpose of producing death, these sentences must be set 
aside.”40 
The Court soon adopted Justice White’s view that 
the death penalty was disproportionate for a defendant who had not 
intended for death to occur, at least for those who had not themselves 
killed or attempted to kill. In particular, Justice White established his view 
as law as the author of Enmund v. Florida just four years after Lockett.41 
In that case, Florida authorized the death penalty against petitioner 
Enmund for aiding and abetting a robbery in the course of which murder 
was committed, even though Enmund was not physically present at the 
killing.42 The Court first noted the rarity of executions for such 
circumstances, both legislatively,43 and as sought by prosecutors and 
imposed by juries.44 On this point, the Court concluded that the death 
penalty appeared disproportionate: 
Petitioner’s argument is that because he did not kill, attempt to 
kill, and he did not intend to kill, the death penalty is disproportionate 
as applied to him, and the statistics he cites are adequately tailored to 
demonstrate that juries—and perhaps prosecutors as well—consider 
death a disproportionate penalty for those who fall within his category.45 
Relying on Lockett, the Court emphasized focusing on the petitioner’s 
own culpability, “not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot 
the victims, for we insist on ‘individualized consideration as a 
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence . . . .’”46 
Accordingly, the Court found petitioner’s death sentence invalid: 
“Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly 
different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them 
40. Id. at 628; see also Ursula Bentele, Multiple Defendant Cases: When the Death Penalty Is 
Imposed on the Less Culpable Offender, 38 Rᴜᴛɢᴇʀs L. Rᴇᴄ. 119, 123 n.33 (2010-2011) (collecting 
articles). 
41. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
42. Id. at 784. 
43. Id. at 792 (“Thus only a small minority of jurisdictions—eight—allow the death penalty to 
be imposed solely because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a 
murder was committed.”). 
44. Id. at 795 (“That juries have rejected the death penalty in cases such as this one where the 
defendant did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did not 
participate in a plot or scheme to murder is also shown by petitioner’s survey of the Nation’s death-
row population.”). 
45. Id. at 796. 
46. Id. at 798 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (footnote omitted)).
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alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the 
Kerseys. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.”47 
Similarly to his Lockett concurrence, Justice White again noted in 
Enmund that the death penalty for those who did not kill or intend to kill 
has limited retributive or deterrent value.48 
While Justice White’s Lockett concurrence proposed a categorical 
death penalty rule requiring a purpose to kill, his Enmund opinion 
“displayed on its surface a marked ambivalence” about making such a rule 
into law.49 Rather, Justice White framed the question in Enmund as 
whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the death 
penalty “for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended 
to take life.”50 At the same time, he indicated that the death penalty might 
apply to those who “intended or contemplated that life would be taken,”51 
or “anticipated that lethal force would or might be used” to effectuate a 
robbery or escape, not merely those with a purpose to kill.52 Unlike in 
Lockett, Justice White’s Enmund analysis does not seem to apply at all to 
actual killers—rather than accomplices—who lacked an intent to kill, 
although such a scenario was not relevant to the facts of Enmund.53 
Rather, Justice White emphasized “Enmund’s intentions, expectations, 
and actions” and the fact that he was not physically present for the 
killing.54 Some have speculated that these departures were to gain Justice 
Blackmun’s vote, who expressed some unease at Justice White’s broad 
assertions in Lockett.55 
47. Id.
48. Id. at 798-99 (“We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty
will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention or 
purpose that life will be taken.”); id. at 801 (“Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he 
did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the 
retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 625 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
49. Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 
B.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1103, 1147 (1990). 
50. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787. 
51. Id. at 801 (emphasis added). 
52. Id. at 788. 
53. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 626 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Under those 
circumstances the conclusion is unavoidable that the infliction of death upon those who had no intent 
to bring about the death of the victim is not only grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime 
but also fails to contribute significantly to acceptable, or indeed any perceptible goals of 
punishment.”). 
54. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 786, 800 (emphasis added). 
55. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1147 n.140 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 614 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (finding a “requirement of actual intent to kill in order to inflict the death penalty” 
unworkable and an incomplete determination of culpability)). 
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Regardless of any ambiguity in Enmund itself, Justice White’s 
decision four years later in Cabana v. Bullock seemed to make his position 
clear: Enmund “imposes a categorical rule: a person who has not in fact 
killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal 
force be used may not be sentenced to death.”56 Bullock seems to make 
clear that contemplating or anticipating the taking of a life is not enough 
if that person “did not themselves kill, or attempt to kill, or intend to 
kill.”57 Accordingly, the Court directed the district court to issue a habeas 
corpus writ vacating the petitioner’s death sentence but leaving to the 
State the choice of either imposing a sentence of life imprisonment or 
reimposing the death sentence after determining whether respondent in 
fact “killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill, or intended that lethal force 
would be used.”58 
After Bullock, the law had largely enshrined Justice White’s Lockett 
concurrence requiring an intent to kill before capital punishment can be 
imposed. This restriction only applied to accomplices, and not those who 
committed or attempted to commit the murder. Nonetheless, it was a 
concrete manifestation of Justice White’s philosophy that executions 
should be limited to those for whom there would be the greatest deterrent 
and retributive value and that any such value is tenuous at best for an 
accomplice without an intent to kill. 
III. RE-EXPANSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOLLOWING TISON
A. Justice White’s Reversal in Tison 
Although Enmund and Bullock seemed to make clear that the law 
required intent to kill for accomplices, the Court reversed course just one 
year after Bullock in Tison v. Arizona.59 Petitioners in that case sprung 
their father from prison, “armed their father and another convicted 
murderer, later helped to abduct, detain, and rob a family of four, and 
watched their father and the other convict murder the members of that 
family with shotguns.”60 Both petitioners stated that they were “surprised 
by the shooting,” though they did not attempt to help the victims.61 The 
Court accepted that neither petitioner intended to kill,62 but held that 
56. 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986). 
57. Id. at 385. 
58. Id. at 392. 
59. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
60. Id. at 137 (syllabus). 
61. Id. at 141. 
62. Id. at 151 (“Petitioners do not fall within the ‘intent to kill’ category of felony murderers
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Enmund did not render unconstitutional the death penalty for defendants 
such as the Tisons, “whose participation is major and whose mental state 
is one of reckless indifference to the value of human life.”63 The Tison 
court did not explicitly overrule Enmund, but instead more or less limited 
that decision to its facts: that the death penalty was unconstitutional for 
“the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither 
intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.”64 
While departing from Enmund, Tison mirrored some of the earlier 
opinion’s reasoning to justify its shift. For example, the Tison court noted 
that sixteen states “authorize the death penalty in a felony-murder case 
where, though the defendant’s mental state fell short of intent to kill, the 
defendant was a major actor in a felony in which he knew death was 
highly likely to occur.”65 The Tison court also relied on a number of state 
court decisions that imposed the death penalty after Enmund, even without 
a clear “intent to kill.”66 The opinion went so far as to reverse the Arizona 
Supreme Court’s finding that the Tisons had an “intent to kill,” in order 
to explicitly hold that such a finding was not required by Enmund.67 
Rather, the Tison Court concluded that “intent to kill” is “a highly 
unsatisfactory means of definitively distinguishing the most culpable and 
dangerous of murderers.”68 Accordingly, the Court held that “the reckless 
disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal 
activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable 
mental state” that may support a capital sentence.69 All of the examples 
the Court cited to support this standard, however, concerned the person 
actually doing the killing—a torturer or robber with reckless 
indifference—rather than an accomplice.70 
Although Justice White had repeatedly advocated for limiting the 
death penalty to those who either “killed, attempted to kill, or intended 
that a killing take place or that lethal force be used,”71 he joined the Tison 
for which Enmund explicitly finds the death penalty permissible under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
63. Id. at 152. 
64. Id. at 149. 
65. Id. at 153-54. As the dissent pointed out, this reasoning did not account for the number of
states that didn’t authorize any death penalty, nor did it consider how many states actually imposed 
the death penalty in such circumstances. Id. at 175-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 154-55 (collecting cases). 
67. Id. at 155 n.11. 
68. Id. at 157. 
69. Id. at 157-58. 
70. Id. at 157. 
71. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986). 
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majority to abrogate that standard.72 The reasons for this change in 
thought are unclear, although the extreme facts of Tison “perhaps explain 
Justice White’s abrupt abandonment of this decade-long effort to require 
an intent to kill as a prerequisite for the death penalty.”73 The Tison dissent 
certainly thought so, noting that the decision to execute the Tisons 
“appears responsive less to reason than to other, more visceral, 
demands.”74 In fact, the dissent cited at length Justice White’s own 
decisions in Enmund and Bullock and his concurrence in Lockett about the 
importance of “[d]istinguishing intentional from reckless action in 
assessing culpability . . . in felony-murder cases” to argue against the 
standard Tison established.75 Nonetheless, Tison has remained the law of 
the land for the decades since it was decided, essentially if not officially 
overruling Justice White’s earlier mens rea standards for capital 
defendants. 
B. The Legacy of Tison and Justice White’s Jurisprudence on Death 
Penalty Mens Rea Requirements 
If Justice White’s goal was to use mens rea to limit capital 
punishment to only the most culpable defendants, his joining the majority 
in Tison appears to have severely undermined that goal. As Tison allowed 
a recklessness standard even for accomplices, “the Tison standard 
rationally can be held to apply to every felony murder accomplice.”76 
After all, “such recklessness and indifference are presumed” when the 
actor is engaged in a dangerous felony.77 Accordingly, Justice White’s 
72. See Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 Hᴏᴜs. 
L. Rᴇᴠ. 1493, 1515–16 (2009) (citing Tison, 481 U.S. at 138). 
73. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1151. See also Batey, supra note 73, at 1515–16 n.131 (citing
Christopher E. Smith, Bright-Line Rules and the Supreme Court: The Tension Between Clarity in 
Legal Doctrine and Justices’ Policy Preferences, 16 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 119, 133-37 (1989) 
(hypothesizing that the majority opinion was a judicial compromise designed to condemn the Tisons 
without overruling Enmund)). 
74. Tison, 481 U.S. at 184-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The urge to employ the felony-murder 
doctrine against accomplices is undoubtedly strong when the killings stir public passion and the actual 
murderer is beyond human grasp.”). Eventually, the Tison brothers were resentenced to life in state 
court. See Richard Ruelas, The Story of Gary Tison’s Fateful Final Escape—From Those Who Were 
There,  ARIZONA REP.  (Sept. 19, 2017, 05:55 AM), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-best-reads/2017/09/19/arizona-tison-gang-
spree-prison-escape-1978/660262001/  [https://perma.cc/68KZ-92Y2]. 
75. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1162 (“In every felony murder case, the defendant has agreed to
commit a dangerous felony and, as a result, someone has ended up dead.”). 
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (“Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if
the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of 
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statement in Lockett “that death may not be inflicted for killings consistent 
with the Eighth Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged 
in conduct with the conscious purpose of producing death,” has since been 
eviscerated by Tison.78 
Some of the problems with Tison were visible from the moment it 
was decided. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, citing Justice 
White’s Lockett concurrence, a person who acts recklessly is 
“qualitatively different” from a person who acted with intent: “[B]ecause 
that person has not chosen to kill, his or her moral and criminal culpability 
is of a different degree than that of one who killed or intended to kill.”79 
Moreover, identifying recklessness is significantly more complicated than 
identifying intent: “[A] court looking at reckless indifference to human 
life is essentially expressing a moral judgment, a judgment of the 
culpability of, and not merely the purpose underlying, a defendant’s 
acts.”80 Justice White himself has repeatedly recognized the difficulty in 
defining “reckless disregard” in other context such as libel suits.81 
Accordingly, the Court went from an identifiable and narrow mens rea 
standard to one that was both qualitatively broader and more difficult to 
define. 
A key consequence of Tison is the decline of an individual’s personal 
culpability as the key measure of who should or should not be sentenced 
to death. Justice Brennan noted that Tison, for example, “left open the 
issue whether a court may constitutionally attribute to a defendant as an 
aggravating factor the manner in which other individuals carried out the 
killings” or “whether the purposes for which other individuals committed 
a crime can be constitutionally attributed to a defendant as an aggravating 
force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.”). 
78. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 627–28 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
79. Tison, 481 U.S. at 170-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[S]ociety has made a judgment, which 
has deep roots in the history of the criminal law . . . distinguishing at least for purpose of the 
imposition of the death penalty between the culpability of those who acted with and those who acted 
without a purpose to destroy life.”) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 626-28 (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)).  
80. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1154 (“As the Court has acknowledged elsewhere, this process
reflects that the concept of reckless indifference is not a fact but a highly subjective evaluative 
judgment with no common core of meaning.”). 
81. See, e.g., St. Amant. v. Thompson St. Amant, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968) (Justice White,
writing for the Court, stating that “‘reckless disregard’ . . . cannot be fully encompassed in one 
infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case 
adjudication.”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 515 (1984) (White, J., 
dissenting) (noting that, unlike “actual knowledge,” he does “not believe that the ‘reckless disregard’ 
component of the New York Times malice standard is a question of historical fact.”). 
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circumstance.”82 Citing to Lockett, he noted that “such vicarious 
attribution ’would seem to violate the core Eighth Amendment 
requirement that capital punishment be based upon an “individualized 
consideration” of the defendant’s culpability.’”83  
For example, the individualized consideration for capital defendants 
became further attenuated after Tison due to the consideration of victim 
impact evidence. The Court in Payne v. Tennessee84 relied on Tison to 
hold that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit victim impact evidence 
at sentencing, even if the defendant was unaware of the impact discussed. 
The Court held that “the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a 
result of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern 
of the criminal law. . . in determining the appropriate punishment.”85 In 
fact, Tison was the sole case the majority cited—joined by Justice 
White—to justify looking at harm when considering a death sentence: 
“[I]f the robbery in which the first defendant participated results in the 
death of a victim, he may be subjected to the death penalty, but if the 
robbery in which the second defendant participates does not result in the 
death of a victim, the death penalty may not be imposed.”86 Justice White 
himself expressed support for this position after Tison, irrespective of the 
defendant’s intention to cause such harm: “There is nothing aberrant in a 
juror’s inclination to hold a murderer accountable not only for his internal 
disposition in committing the crime but also for the full extent of the harm 
he caused. . . .”87 In other words, Justice White no longer treated a 
82. White v. Dugger, 483 U.S. 1045, 1049 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari and stay) (citation omitted). 
83. Id. (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605); see also Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Overstepping 
Precedent? Tison v. Arizona Imposes the Death Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C. L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 817, 837 (1988) (“Rather than admit that the Court focused on the harm committed by Gary 
Tison, the father of the defendants, the Court invoked a contrived distinction between Enmund and 
Tison.”) (emphasis in original). 
84. 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991). 
85. Id. (“Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty of different
offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm.”). 
86. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987)). 
87. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1987) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by
Payne, 501 U.S. at 830. Justice White encouraged juries to consider harm due in part to his faith in 
the system, in particular that the Court should not presume that the jury will consider impermissible 
factors such as the race of the victim. Id. at 517 (citations omitted). 
I fail to see why the State cannot, if it chooses, include as a sentencing consideration the 
particularized harm that an individual’s murder causes to the rest of society and in partic-
ular to his family. To the extent that the Court is concerned that sentencing juries might 
be moved by victim impact statements to rely on impermissible factors such as the race of 
the victim, there is no showing that the statements in this case encouraged this, nor should 
we lightly presume such misconduct on the jury’s part. 
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defendant’s culpability as a clear line demarcating who can and cannot 
face capital punishment. 
Despite his support for victim impact evidence, Justice White 
continued to be troubled by expanding the penalties for those without the 
sufficiently culpable intent. In his final years on the Court, Justice White 
dissented from a non-capital opinion upholding a statutorily mandated 
penalty of life without possibility of parole for narcotics possession by 
citing to his opinion in Enmund: “To be constitutionally proportionate, 
punishment must be tailored to a defendant’s personal responsibility and 
moral guilt.”88 He seemed particularly troubled by an opinion upholding 
a death penalty delivered under instructions that did not require the jury 
to agree on one of the alternative theories of premeditated and felony 
murder. That case, Schad v. Arizona, relied on Tison to note that anyone 
convicted of felony murder could be presumed to have the requisite intent, 
and could be viewed as equivalent to one who committed premeditated 
murder: 
Whether or not everyone would agree that the mental state that precipi-
tates death in the course of robbery is the moral equivalent of premedi-
tation, it is clear that such equivalence could reasonably be found, which 
is enough to rule out the argument that this moral disparity bars treating 
them as alternative means to satisfy the mental element of a single of-
fense.89 
Justice White, in his dissent, found such equivalence “unbelievable,” and 
asserted felony murder does not automatically qualify for the death 
penalty without further findings such as mens rea: 
Thus, this Court has required that in order for the death penalty to be 
imposed for felony murder, there must be a finding that the defendant in 
fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that 
lethal force be used or that the defendant was a major participant in the 
felony and exhibited reckless indifference to human life.90 
Although this statement accurately sums up the conclusions of Tison, 
Justice White neglected to see that the expansive view in Schad—
allowing the death penalty for any felony murder—was a direct result of 
that earlier decision. Once the Court declared that recklessness and major 
88. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1023 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). 
89. 501 U.S. 624, 644 (1991). 
90. Id. at 658-59 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797;
Tison, 481 U.S. at 158). 
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participation are sufficient to impose the death penalty on an accomplice, 
it is difficult to conceive of a murder in which a factfinder could not be 
satisfied that such expansive and generalized concepts are met.91 Justice 
White’s assertion in Lockett, that “it violates the Eighth Amendment to 
impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant possessed 
a purpose to cause the death of the victim,” accordingly has long since 
failed to be the rule of the Court.92 
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice White’s majority opinions in Enmund and Bullock were the 
fruition of the principles espoused in his Lockett concurrence: that the 
Court “insist[s] on ‘individualized consideration as a constitutional 
requirement in imposing the death sentence,’”93 and that the death penalty 
for those who did not kill or intend to kill has limited retributive or 
deterrent value.94 Thus, Justice White for a time succeeded in establishing 
a “categorical rule: a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to kill, 
or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used may not be 
sentenced to death.”95 Even though this standard imposed a higher mens 
rea requirement only on those who did not themselves kill or attempt to 
kill, it nonetheless represented a significant red line demarcating the 
acceptable outer limits of eligibility for capital punishment. 
When Justice White joined the majority in Tison, however, any such 
limitation disappeared. Now, the death penalty is available even for those 
who did not kill, attempt to kill, or even intend for a killing to take place, 
so long as they were a major participant in the felony and exhibited 
reckless indifference to human life.96 The expansion of the death penalty 
decimated the categorical limit on eligibility, at least as far as mens rea is 
concerned. This expansive practice exists to this day.97 
91. Id. at 645 (“There we held that ‘the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly 
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents [such] a highly culpable 
mental state . . . that [it] may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when 
that conduct causes its natural, though not inevitable, lethal result.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58). 
92. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
93. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605(footnote omitted)).
94. Id. at 798-99, 801; see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 625 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). 
95. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986). 
96. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. 
97. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mississippi, 138 S. Ct. 2567, 2570 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (“Mississippi is one of a small number of States in which defendants may be 
(and, in Mississippi’s Second Circuit Court District, routinely are) sentenced to death for, among 
other things, felony robbery murder without any finding or proof of intent to kill.”). 
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As noted above, this expanded understanding of the death penalty 
undermines the Court’s stated goals of deterrence and individualized 
consideration. As a result of Tison, a defendant may be sentenced to death 
for the fatal conduct of someone else involved in the felony, even if the 
defendant did not intend or even know that a killing would occur.98 This 
results in a lack of individualized consideration—being punished for 
something the defendant perhaps did not do or even know about—as well 
as a lack of deterrence effect. As Justice White explained in Lockett, after 
all, if one is unaware that a killing will occur, the death penalty is unlikely 
to enter the calculous of whether to proceed with a felony.99 While there 
continues to be a requirement that a defendant display reckless 
indifference to qualify for capital punishment, any individual engaged in 
a dangerous felony can potentially satisfy that requirement.100 
Accordingly, any deterrent value for the death penalty in such cases—on 
the chance that a fatality may occur, even if one is not planned or 
foreseen—is minimal at best. 
In fact, the Court continues to note with approval the standards 
espoused by Enmund and Bullock, to the extent they survive beyond 
Tison, In Graham v. Florida, for example, the Court relied on Enmund to 
hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole sentences 
for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide: 
The Court has recognized that defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, 
or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the 
most serious forms of punishment than are murderers. . . It follows that, 
when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not 
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.101 
The Court also relied on Enmund to prohibit the death penalty for 
“mentally retarded criminals” due in part to lack of deterrent value: “[I]t 
seems likely that ‘capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when 
murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.’”102 
98. See supra Part IV.
99. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 625 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The value
of capital punishment as a deterrent to those lacking a purpose to kill is extremely attenuated. 
Whatever questions may be raised concerning the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent to 
intentional murders — and that debate rages on — its function in deterring individuals from becoming 
involved in ventures in which death may unintentionally result is even more doubtful.”).  
100.  See supra Part III. 
101.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010) (citations omitted). 
102.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (“The theory of deterrence in capital 
sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit 
criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct.”) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799)). 
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If the Court continues to uphold the death penalty, the Court’s oft-
cited principles of individualized consideration and deterrence would be 
better served by adopting Justice White’s Lockett requirement in capital 
cases of “a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct with the 
conscious purpose of producing death . . . .”103 An “intent” standard for 
capital defendants at the very least should apply to those who themselves 
did not kill or attempt to kill, if not for all capital defendants. To hold 
otherwise allows the death penalty to proceed regardless of individual 
culpability or deterrent value in violation of the Eighth Amendment.104 
103.  Lockett, 438 U.S. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 104.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (“A penalty with such 
negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative 
of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
